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IN THE SUPREME CO·UR T 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FUNERAL DIRECTORS & EMBALMERS I 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation, on behalf I 
of its members, and UNION MORTUARY COM-
pANY, a Utah corporation, on its own behalf and 
on behalf of others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs - Appellant, 
-Vs.-
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE VALLEY, INC., 
·a Utah corporation; MEMORIAL TRUSTS, INC., 
a Utah corporation; LAKE HILLS, a Utah cor-
poration; AULTOREST MEMORIAL CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporation; HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING and RAYMOND W. GEE, 
members of the Business Regulation Commission 
of the State of Utah; and VIRGIL L. NORTON, 
Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Utah, 
Defendants- Respondents 
~ No. 10236 
1 Case 
APP'ELLAN.T''S. REP'L Y BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S DECI-
SION, ANY FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR EM-
BALMER, WHO PERFORI\IS FUNERAI.J 
SERVICES OR FURNISHES BURIAL FA-
GILITIES PURSUANT TO A PRE-NEED 
CONTRACT OBTAINED BY SOLICITATION 
BY EITHER OF THE DEFENDANTS, SO-
LICITED OR SOLD BY AND FOR THEM-
SELVES, OR WHICH RESULTS TO THE 
BENEFIT OF A FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR 
EMBALMER WHO PERFORMS THE FU-
NERAL SERVICES OR FURNISHES THE 
BURIAL FACILITIES, IS GUILTY OF UN-
PROFESSIONA.L AND UNETHICAL CON-
1 
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DUCT AS DEFINED IN SECTIONS 58-9-10 
AND 58-9-22 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953. 
The only Defendants who answered the above point 
of Plaintiff are the Defendants Memorial Trusts, Inc., 
and Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. They devote 
several pages of their briefs to saying only that they are 
not agents of any Funeral Directors or Embalmers. 
That their contracts do not expressly make them agents, 
and that they operate for no single one Funeral Director 
or Embalmer in the State. They also make it clear that 
they are not Funeral Directors or Embalmers. They 
offer no explanation whatsoever, to help the court as to 
how they can accomplish the solicitation of Funeral Busi-
ness for the benefit of Funeral Directors and Embalmers 
when the Funeral Director and Embalmer himself would 
violate the law if he solicited that Business personally or 
through an Agent. They merely complain that their 
right to contract is being interfered with. 
The intent of the law is to correct the evil of solicita-
tion of Funeral Business. The legislature undoubtedly 
anticipated that others than Funeral Directors and Em-
balmers might be involved in trying to solicit for the 
benefit of Funeral Directors and Embalmers and said 
solicitation was still wrong whether done directly or indi-
rectly. Regardless of the play on words indulged in by 
these two defendants, what difference does it make who 
commits the prohibited evil for the benefit of a Funeral 
Director or Embalmer. What an indictment it would 
be of our legal system if it is illegal for a person to per-
sonally commit an illegal act yet it \Vould be legal for 
2 
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some one else to do it for him and for his benefit. It 
would be equally as absurd to say that a Funeral Director 
cannot enter into a contract with ·a person by solicitation 
of Funeral Business, yet the defendants c.an enter into 
the same contract '\vith the same person for the benefit 
of the Funeral Director and the law would hold it legal. 
Plaintiffs submit that these Defendants have given no 
reasons for their position except to say, ''we are not 
agents because we said so.'' Plaintiffs refer the court 
to their original discussion of this problem. The de-
fendants can be nothing but agents and these contracts 
providing Funeral Benefits by their Solicitation are in 
violation of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II. 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER 
COURT'S DECISION, THE CONTRACTS 
SOLD BY THE DEFENDANTS ARE ALL 
SUBJECT TO THE PRE-NEED LAW OF 
UTAH AND THE CONTRACT USED AND 
ISSUED BY THE DEFENDANT, MEMORIAL 
TRUST, INC., IS PARTICULARLY IN VIO-
LATION OF THE PRE-NEED LAW OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, AS CONTAINED IN SEC-
TION 22-4-4, CHAPTER 39, LAWS OF UTAH, 
1955 AND AS AMENDED IN CHAPTER 45, 
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, AND THAT SAID DE-
FENDANTS' PRE-NEED CONTRACT PAR-
TICULARLY PERMITS SAID DEFENDANTS 
TO DEMAND AND RECEIVE THE EARN-
INGS OF THE TRUST FUNDS AND PAY 
SAID FUNDS TO SAID DEFENDANT CON-
TRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID SEC-
TION 22-4-4 AFORESAID. 
3 
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Section 22-4-4 U.C.A. 1953 (1963 Supplement) ,vas 
intended to protect a depositor's funds as against the day 
he needed them for a funeral or personally withdrew 
them. The same protective purpose is accomplished in 
Banking, Insurance and Securities Law. This section 
provides that every cent of this deposit plus ''interest 
and earnings" is to be considered as a unit, and deliv-
ered on death to the original Payor only upon Surren-
der of the Pass Book. Said Payor may take part of said 
Fund, but the balance (Section 22-4-5 U.C.A. 1953) shall 
be held by the bank for 5 days and until a Certified 
Copy of the death Certificate, the pass book, and a veri-
fied statement that the Pre-need Contract has been fully 
performed, have all been surrendered and submitted to 
the bank of deposit. The balance of the funds shall then 
be released to the- decedent's estate or the original pur-
chaser. Any depositor may at any time withdraw his 
entire fund and cancel the trust deposit. If he so elects, 
the pre-need or any other type of contract would also 
be cancelled as well as the Trust Companies' obligations. 
But as long as the fund or any part remains, and the 
pre-need Obligations are in force the moneys cannot be 
paid out to any other persons than those specifically men-
tioned in the Statute. The entire purpose of the statute 
becomes a complete nullity if otherwise interpreted. The 
fund could be wasted away before its purpose was in any 
way accomplished. The provision that ALL PAY-
MENTS be deposited would have no meaning. What 
purpose does a statute of this type have if after ALL 
PAYMENTS received have been deposited, if the statute 
is interpreted to mean that others may later come in and 
4 
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by agreement, fraud or otherwise deplete and use up the 
whole fund. Other persons in positions similar to the 
defendants may not be as fair and solicitious of the de-
positor's interest, as the present defendants claim they 
might be. The law permits nothing to be taken out for 
commissions or otherwise. Where does the Defendant's 
Memorial Trusts, Inc., get the Authority to deduct any-
thing1 How do they arrive at any amount~ What is to 
prevent them from taking all of it, if anything is per-
mitted~ If they are permitted to deduct anything at all, 
there is no stated limit and they could therefore take it 
all and destroy the purpose of the law. 
Several states provide that all the funds be deposited 
and held. See quotation from the Case of Messerli v. 
Monarch Memory Gardens, Inc. (Idaho 1964), 397 Pac. 
2nd 34, 42, at page 22 of this Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER 
COURT'S DECISION, THE PRE-NEED CON-
TRACTS, BEING SOLD BY THE DEFEND-
ANT COMPANIES AND WHICH ARE THE 
SUBJECTS OF THE CONTROVERSY IN 
THIS CASE, ARE INSURAN,CE CONTRACTS 
AND SUBJECT TO THE INSURANCE LAWS 
OF THIS STATE AND THEREFORE, SUB-
JECT TO REGULATION BY THE UTAH 
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AND 
THAT THE SAID DEFENDANT COMPAN-
IES, ISSUING SAID CONTRACTS ARE ALSO 
SUBJECT TO THE INSURANCE LAWS OF 
5 
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UTAH AND THE REGULATIONS OF THE 
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Defendant Companies have raised two or three 
issues in their attempt to show that their contracts are 
not insurance and that they should not be required to be 
regulated and licensed by the UTAH STATE lNSUR-
AN·CE DEPARTMENT. 
The Defendant Companies would make it appear by 
the Briefs that they have submitted, and especially as 
developed in the Brief for MEMORIAL TRUST, that the 
sole and only measure of an Insurance Contract is by 
definition. The question as to the need of a "risk" is 
discussed in great length and several cases are quoted. 
The writer would like to call to the Court's attention 
that the basic and much more important reason for insur-
ance regulation is determined by much more important 
principles than a mere definition. It should he very 
obvious by the least bit of research that definitions are 
multiple and their applications equally multiple. 
In one of the cases quoted by the Defendant MEMO-
RIA'L TRUSTS, this matter of Insurance definitions is 
discussed by the Court. This is a quotation from a case 
relied upon by the Defendant 1\d:EMORIAL TRUSTS to 
wit: South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison (Ga. 
1936), 188 S.E. 529, 530 : 
''What constitutes life insurance and the dissect-
ing of it into its elements is a problem that holds 
forth no prospect of absolute solution. Various 
definitions have been attempted. The law, how-
ever, is not fond of definitio·ns, and those defini-
6 
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tions are to be taken, perhaps, rathe-r as state-
ments of the learned men who make them, of the 
contract as they find it existing around them, than 
as strict definitions which contain every essential 
element without which the contract cannot exist, 
and which excludes everything not necessary to its 
being. * * * Yet it has been held by this court that 
the Code definition was not exhaustive, and that a 
contract may be one of life insurance though 
payable in goods or services of value. Benevolent 
Burial Ass 'n Inc., v. Harrison, 181 Ga. 230, 238, 
181, S.E. 529. * * * The contract on its face does 
not appear to be one of life insurance. The con-
tract involved in the case out of which this con-
tempt proceeding arose is a contract of life insur-
ance in and of itself." 
It is to be granted that because of the great number 
of problems that arise in this field, there is not absolute 
harmony in the cases, but all references agree with the 
fact that in all cases that have gone before the Supreme 
Courts involving Burial Contracts, Pre-Need Contracts, 
and Funeral Contracts the great majority of those cases 
have been held by our Supreme Courts as Insurance. 
This fact cannot be disputed. 
A Life Insurance Contract is not one of indemnity, 
and, therefore, the problem of ''risk'' is entirely a differ-
ent problem with Life Insurance Contracts than with In-
demnity type of Contracts such as fire and automobile. 
In Section 4 of Insurance, in the 29th Vol. of American 
Jurisprudence, at Page 435, where the definition of In-
surance is involved, we read as follows: 
''Consequently, in the ordinary life insuranee 
policy taken out to provide for dependents, it is a 
7 
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misnomer to speak of death as a ''loss'' in the 
sense in which the burning of a building is spoken 
of as a ''loss.'' Another reason why a contract 
of life insurance cannot be considered one of the 
indemnity is that life insurance on the level-pre-
mium plan combines investment with protection.'' 
In Section 8, p. 438, of Insurance in the 29th Vol. of 
American Jurisprudenee, we are told definitely that a ma-
jority of the cases have adopted a. view that contracts 
for the payments for burial or funeral expenses are in-
surance contracts and subject to the Insurance Laws. 
This is also told to us in Section XIV, of Vol. I, of 
Applema.n, in INsURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE, at Page 29 
it reads there as follows: 
''Often such associations are started by under-
takers who agree to provide services. These con-
tracts have come frequently before the Courts for 
construction. The almost uniform tenancy of the 
Courts have been to hold that they constitute life 
insurance.'' 
May we again emphasize the weakness of solving 
these problems by trying to hang upon any one defini-
tion or upon definitions generally. Our quotation above 
certainly emphasizes that point, but it appears almost too 
elementary to say that the purpose of Insurance Laws 
compelling qualifications before and with Insurance De-
partments is for the protection of the public. Therefore, 
regardless of what a person may call his contract, regard-
less of whether it technically meets a definition or not, we 
are confronted with the very simple proposition that, if 
an individual or a company, or a group of persons take 
8 
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the money of another and exercise control over it, they 
are required to meet regulations for the safety and pro-
tection of that individual. Without over-simplifying 
the matter, this is certainly the purpose of insurance reg-
ulations. There can be no dispute of the fact that the 
Defendant Companies are definitely in that category, and 
a majority of the Courts of this country have so ex-
pressed themselves to the effect that such contracts and 
such relationships must be regulated by Insurance De-
partments. 
This matter has already been referred to in the 
Plaintiffs' Brief in a quotation from State v. Mynette 
Funeral Home case at the bottom of page 15 of the Plain-
tiffs' Brief. Also this matter is discussed in a quotation 
in the Plaintiffs' Brief beginning at the bottom of page 
13 in the case of State v. Mutual Mortuary Association, 
Inc. In the case of the Oklahoma Southw·est B~trial Asso-
ciation v. State (Okla. 1929), 27 4 Pac. 642, the Court in 
addition to deciding that a regular Burial Contract in-
volving merchandise and services was one of Insurance, 
discussed the need of protection to the individual by 
Insurance Regulatory measures, and stated as follows: 
"In the instant case the object of the organiza-
tion is one of profit to its promotors. It offered as 
an inducement to the public certain benefits ba:;;ed 
upon a fixed money consideration. If the consid-
eration is not paid, then no benefits are conferred. 
Suppose the Association should meet with finan-
cial misfortune, and its obligations to its members 
fail' Suppose a large fund is collected and un-
wisely invested and lost to the membership and 
9 
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the association is incapable of meeting funeral 
costs of its members~ 
''It clearly appears to be based on commercial 
purposes, and its manner of doing business con-
stitutes an Insurance System, and that its mem-
bership is entitled to the protection of the Insur-
ance Laws of this State.'' 
In the case of Renschler v. Hogan (Ohio 1914), 107 
N.E. 758, after deciding that the Burial Contract was one 
of insurance the Court also discussed the matter of pro-
tection and stated as follows : 
''It is an intention on one hand to receive, and 
on the other hand to provide a fund to pay the 
insured's burial expenses. The Contract is a 
naked insurance contract and nothing else, and 
is subject to the regulation by the State Insurance 
Department, (the court discussed further how the 
individual should he bound on these matters the 
same as corporations and others), and then pro-
ceeded to state as follows: 
''To hold otherwise would work a far-reaching 
hardship on the part of our population most need-
ful of the protection of the State and lead to a 
return of the old "wild-cat" insurance status now 
happily a thing of the past.'' 
We submit that the Defendant Companies have no 
right either in law or in fact to take other people's money, 
and to object to any form of regulation whatsoever, and 
that appears to be their contention throughout this whole 
case. There is a suggestion of self-imposed regulation 
by one or two of the Defendants, but that has never 
p·roved sufficient for the safety of the public in any field 
or at any time whatsoever. 
10 
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Defendant MEMORIAL TRUSTS quotes certain 
cases which discuss certain definitions of insurance which 
emphasize ''risk distribution.'' We refer to the cases 
beginning on page 17 of Brief of Memorial Trust, Inc., 
starting with the: ''The United States Supreme Court 
case in Melvering v. Lagierse (1940), 312 U.S. 531 at 
539; in Re: Ba.rr's Esta.te (Cal. 1951), 231 Pac. 2nd, 876; 
in Re: Smiley's Estate (Wash. 1950), 216 Pac. 2nd 212; 
South Georgina Funeral Home v. Harrison, (Ga. 1936), 
188 S.E. 529, and in Re: Clark's Estate (Utah 1960) 10, 
Utah 2nd, 427, 354 Pac. 2nd 112. These cases do not give 
us any assistance whatsoever in the problem before the 
Court. Everyone of these cases was interpreting Insur-
ance Contracts for the purpose of taxation, and deter-
mining whether or not the proceeds on these particular 
policies or contracts should be taxed. These cases pri-
marily are involved with the matter of Annuity Insur-
ance. It is hardly necessary to call the Court's attention 
to the fact that Annuity Contracts have been a head-
ache to the Courts for many years on the question as to 
whether or not Annuity is Life Insurance. As fast as one 
case is decided a new one comes up, but they invariably 
hold that Annuity Insurance is not Life Insurance and 
therefore must be taxed. Even today in our Utah Code 
Premium Tax is not charged on Annuity Insurance. But 
please note that any company writing annuities payable 
on death, must qualify under the Insurance laws of the 
state of Utah or any other state. Neither one of these 
c~ses made any decision whatsoever as to our problem, 
namely: Were these contracts of the type that required 
Insurance Commission regulation. That issue was not 
11 
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decided in either one of these cases. They merely de-
cided the simple proposition as to whether or not Annuity 
Insurance .Proceeds should be taxed. It should inter-
est the court to quote further from the case of in Re: 
Ba,rr's Estate,. referred to above, and submitted by the 
Defendant MEMORIAL TRUSTS as one of the cases 
upon which it relied. This case, also, decided a matter 
regarding the proceeds of Annuity Insurance, and mere-
ly held these proceeds should be taxed, and then the 
Court ( p. 879) stated as follows : 
''That Annuities are considered Insuranee under 
the Insurance Codes of various States, but indi-
cated that this does not require that Annuities be 
classified as Insurance under the revenue codes 
for taxation purposes.'' 
The Court then points out again that the objects of 
the two different statutes namely, Insurance regulation 
and Revenue collection are entirely different. This ma-
terjal is discussed at Page 879 in that case. 
We think it should also be noted that wherever death 
is involved, or whether a Contract is based upon the con-
tingency of death, there hardly appears to be any argu-
ment that there is no risk involved. This is the very 
basis of Life Insurance. Such contracts are all based 
upon the contingency of death. This question has arisen 
frequently in these Burial and Funeral Service Contracts 
under discussion in this case, and the Courts have fre-
quently held that there can he absolutely no question 
and it would be foolish otherwise to contemplate that 
these Contracts were not made on contingency of death. 
12 
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We refer the Court to our Plaintiffs' Brief already on 
file in this case in the quotations at Page 30 of the Plain-
tiffs' Brief. Those cases discuss the foolishness of con-
sidering that a person would buy a casket for use during 
his lifetime, and in other approaches makes it clear that 
for every reason these contracts are based upon the con-
tingency of death, which is risk enough to make all other 
life insurance- policies insurance contracts. 
Defendant Company, MEMORIAL GARDENS OF 
THE VALLEY, in their Brief (p. 27) refers to the case 
of Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians Service, 243 Pac. 2nd, 
1053, as proof that these Contracts and similar ones that 
are under discussion are not considered Insurance Con-
tracts. This case is very similar to several other cases 
that have been before the Courts, and one case notably is 
the case of Jordan v. Group· Health Association, 107 
Federal 2nd 239. These cases all involve associations 
that act as a medium to get service with physicians who 
promise to take care of the health needs of the individual 
members who pay monthly dues and are entitled to the 
physician's help. It should be noted that these asso-
ciations make no promises, have no obligations whatso-
ever to the members, neither guarantee nor pro~se 
any service whatsoever, and are merely in an agency 
capacity between the physician and the member. These 
cases have no relationship whatsoever to the cases be-
fore the Court. Nor do they have any similar character-
istics in any way. These are Contracts for physicians' 
services with physicians. The Defendants all maintain 
they are not Funeral Directors or Embalmers, yet their 
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contracts provide for everything connected with a Fu-
neral (R. 8, 9, 12 (1st Paragraph) 19, 40 rear). Even 
though MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE VALLEY 
claim they only agree to sell caskets (R. 27), they admit 
to the use and sale of the contract found on page 8 of the 
transcript of Record. This contract provides a complete 
funeral. If these Defendants are not Funeral Directors 
or Embalmers, these complete funeral services agreed 
to, are not services provided to them and are therefore 
insurance. See Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians Service, 
Sup,ra, and Jordan v. Group Health Associa.tion, Supra. 
The principle is simple. A physician may collect money 
in advance for his services but no strang·er can collect 
money to provide for a physician - that is insurance. 
Defendants are selling insurance if they take money to 
provide any item not part of their own trade and which 
they have to go elsewhere to get. 
Stated another way, these two cases hold that any-
one selling his own services, part of his own trade, items 
or services that he can personally supply because he is 
in that business, can collect money in advance for the 
sale- of his services, or merchandise. That is not insur-
ance. But if a person collects money in advance and 
promises to provide a service or merchandise which he 
must go elsewhere to get, or the promise to produce 
money as a benefit, is selling Insurance, the reason is 
very elementary. The insurance laws are there to pro-
tect the funds that have to be used to buy those services 
or merchandise from some one else or from "\vhich money 
benefits must be paid. A sale of one's own services has 
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• 
never been held insurance. The case of Jordon v. Group 
Health Association, Supra, discusses this difference 
thoroughly and is a well-written case. A study of the 
eontracts of the Defendants who admit they are not Fu-
neral Directors or Embalmers show that EVERYONE 
procures the complete services of a Funeral Director and 
all the necessary merchandise of a Funeral. MEMO-
RIAL TRUSTS, INC. admit in the third paragraph on 
page 9 of their brief that they will have the burden of 
making the arrangements for a Funeral Director. In-
surance regulations will guarantee that funds are avail-
able to get a Funeral Director when needed. 
This same situation was involved in the case cited 
by the Defendant MEMORIAL TRUSTS, IN,O. (p. 17) in 
their brief, South Georgia Fwneral Homes, Inc. v. Har-
rison, Supra, where the contract was with a Funeral 
Home, the Court held there was no risk because they had 
merely paid for the value of the services to be performed 
by one who could supply the services. 
A recent case which was decided since the original 
appellants' brief was pointed is a case from the Supreme 
Court of Idaho. It involves pre-need contracts and de-
cides the problem of whether or not they are insurance. 
The Contracts involved in that case are to all intents and 
purposes the same as involved in the case before the 
Court. The case thoroughly goes into the matter of in-
surance, holds the Idaho Contracts are insurance and 
subject to the Idaho Insurance Laws. Appellant desires 
to refer this Court to that decision for study rather than 
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making extensive quotes. The case is Messerli v. JJI on.-
a.rch Memory Gardens, Inc., Supra. The Idaho Case 
quotes from J orda;n v. Group Health Association, Supra, 
and may we here repeat only part of their decision : 
''That an incidental element of risk distribution 
or assumption may be present should not out-weigh 
all other factors. If attention is focused only on 
that feature, the line between insurance or in-
demnity and other types of legal arrangement and 
economic function becomes faint, if not extinct. 
This is especially true when the contract is for the 
sale of goods or services on contingency. But ob-
viously it was not the purpose of the insuranc.e 
statutes to regulate all arrangements for assuml)-
tion or distribution of risk. That view would 
cause them to engulf practically all contracts, par-
ticularly conditional sales and contingent servic.e 
agreements. The fallacy is in looking only at the 
risk element, to the exclusion of all others present 
or their subordination to it. The question turns, 
not on whether risk is involved or assumed, but on 
whether that or something else to which it is re-
lated in the particular plan is in its principal ob-
ject and purpose." 
'' * * * As we have said, it is the plan as a whole, 
not artifiically disjoined and segregated single 
phases of it, with which we are concerned. * * *" 
The appellants have not, insofar as the pleadings 
or evidence disclose, engaged in the general un-
dertaking business nor have they engaged in the 
manufacture or sale of g·eneral burial supplies, or 
acquired any of the facilities therefor. 
The Idaho Supreme Court had no trouble finding 
sufficient ''Risk'' to meet any insurance requirements 
(p. 45). 
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The Defendant companies have made another refer-
ence which the Plaintiffs feel should be answered: 
It is claimed that the Pre-Need Law was intended 
to supplement all Insurance requirements. This the 
Plaintiffs oppose strenuously. This is also an admis-
sion, a.t least, so impliedly that they are dealing, and 
selling, with Insurance Contracts. Likewise, they are 
contending that the Pre-Need Law is unconstitutional 
which, if upheld, would leave the membership or Policy 
Holders ·completely without protection of any kind by 
the State. 
There is nothing to indicate in the Law anywhere 
that the Pre-Need Law was intended to supplement any 
Insurance Law whatsoever. On the contrary Section 
22-4-6, of the Pre-Need Law provides as follows: 
''This Act shall not apply to, or effect the opera-
tions and business of duly licensed a.ssocia tions 
or companies under the Insurance Laws of the 
State of Utah.'' 
Certainly, this merely says that no Insurance Com-
pany shall be required to qualify unde-r the Pre-Need 
Law, but says nothing about Pre-Need Contracts not 
being regulated as insurance, which certainly suggests 
impliedly that there is a connection, and was a. connec-
tion in the minds of the legislators, namely, that there is 
a connection between Pre-Need Contracts, and Insurance 
Contracts. This Section implies this last interpretation 
much more than it implies that Pre-Need Contracts are 
not Insurance ·Contracts. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT IV. 
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER 
COURT'S DECISION, THOSE PORTIONS OF 
SECTIONS 22-4-1, 22-4-2, 22-4-3, 22-4-4, 22-4-5 
AND 22-4-7 OF THE PRE-NEED LAW OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, CHAPTER 39 OF 
THE 1955 LAWS OF UTAH AS AMENDED 
BY CHAPTER 45 OF THE 1957 LAWS OF 
UTAH AND WHICH SECTIONS ARE QUOT-
ED IN THE LOWER COURT'S Al\1ENDED 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, DATED SEP-
TEMBER 18, 1964 (R. 46) ARE CONSTITU-
TIONAL. 
Defendants MEMORIAL TRUSTS, INC. and ME-
MORIAL GARDENS OF THE V ALL·EY, INC., both 
' 
submit arguments on the above point. They make no 
reference to any part of the Pre-Need Law that hurts 
them. They submit many quotations holding that un-
reasonable regulatory laws, and laws that are restrictive, 
that infringe on people's rights, that are confiscatory, 
and not a proper use of police power, makes such laws 
illegal and unconstitutional. To this we all agree. We 
are all against sin. But just because a law regulates a 
business does not make it illegal. Regulation is a well 
accepted, standard order of our present economy. The 
Defendants are objecting to all forms of Reg·ulation. 
The peculiar position of the Defendants, objecting 
to the Regulations provided in the Pre-Need Law, is that 
they are neither Funeral Directors nor Embalmers. This 
law was intended as a. means of protecting all funds of a 
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person who wanted to save for his Funeral Costs. The 
bank that holds those funds is allowed to put the funds 
out at interest and account for the net earn.in.gs only. 
(Section 22-4-2 U.C.A. 1953.) This law was never in-
tended to serve as a source of income to strangers like 
the defendants. Such an interpretation continually kills 
the purpose of our Pre-Need Law, to-wit, to save 100% 
of the depositor's funds. It seems very presumptions 
that a stranger should be allowed to have the law de-
clared unconstitutional because he cannot make any 
money out of it. ( See arguments on pp. 19-22 Memorial 
Gardens, Inc. Brief.) 
These defendants further object to the law on the 
ground that regulations to control people who take the 
money of others is ''Confiscatory'' and is ''Class Legis-
lation.'' That argument wipes out all the laws relating 
to Banking, Insurance Companies, and Securities. Funds 
collected from people under the Pre-Need Laws need pro-
tection equally as effective as in any other field. Banks 
and Insurance Companies always end up paying· more 
than was put in because of the right to invest as provided 
for banks in the Utah Pre-Need Law. A sample of the 
type of cases used by Defendants to support their posi-
tion, is the case of Prate Undertaking Comparn.y v. State 
Board of Embalming (pp. 22-23 of Memorial Gardens 
Brief). The law in question in that case was held to 
prevent Funeral Directors and Embalmers from con-
tracting to supply a funeral. This is not even suggested 
in the Utah Pre-Need Law nor in our Case before· this 
Court. 
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Our Utah Pre-Need Law does not even hint at such 
a regulation. It leaves Funeral Directors and persons 
entirely free to contract. The Prate Case has no point to 
make in this discussion. The other cases also merely re-
peat accepted principles but not one reference is made 
to any evil of our Pre-Need Law. Respondents merely 
allege that it is "regulatory" and "Stifling on the re-
spondents herein,'' but there is no showing that it in any 
way hurts the parties intended to benefit by it. 
The Briefs of Defendants use numerous cases upon 
which they rely, and from which they quote to this 
Court some very pertinent generalizations as to what 
' 
constitutes denial of equal protection, prohibitory re-
strictions and many other evils, but those cases involve 
statutes, oecupations, and conditions other than Pre-Need 
Funeral C on.tracts, and on problems entirely different 
than the case before the Court. 
May vve direct this Court's attention to a case de-
cided by our sister state of Idaho since the appellants' 
brief was wrtiten. It is the case of Messerli v. M anarch 
Memory Gardens, Inc. (1964) 397 Pac. 2nd 34. This case 
is the last expression of a great majority of the Courts in 
the United States on the problems before the Court, i. e., 
Pre-Need statutes and eon tracts. In the Idaho case, to 
all intents and purposes, the exact contracts were in-
volved, and statutes that differ very little, if any, from 
the material provisions of our Utah Pre-Need Law. It 
would be necessary to quote the entire case to give to 
this Court all the arguments and holdings of the Idaho 
Court. Therefore, may \Ye refer this court to that case 
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and merely quote a few paragraphs from the Idaho 
decision: 
It is universally recognized that the enactment of 
statutes having for their object the prevention 
of fraud and deceit is within the police power of 
the state. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law ~ 187 page 
924. A broad discretion is necessarily vested in 
the legislature to determine not only what the 
interests of the public welfare required, but what 
measures are necessary to secure such interests. 
It must be conceded, and this court has stated, 
that a regulation abridging or restricting the free-
dom of contract or regulating the right to engage 
in any lawful business in a lawful manner must 
be reasonable and must reasonably tend to accom-
plish or promote the protection and welfare of 
the public. 
The concern is not whether the legislative action 
affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indi-
rectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to 
a legitimate end and the measures taken are rea-
sonable and appropriate to that end. 
When we consider that the contract payments are 
to be made within a short period of time as com-
pared to the average lapse of time until perform-
ance of the "pre-need" contracts; that during 
the long interval between full receipt of the pur-
chase price and contract performance, the possi-
bilities for fraud are great and risk of insolvency, 
with consequent inability to perform are inher-
ent, it is then that the wisdom of the legislation 
becomes apparent. 
Appellants have recognized the need of some pro-
tection for the purchaser by including in their 
form of contract certain indefinite provisions rel-
ative to setting aside a trust fund. However, 
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these allusory prov1s1ons perhaps furnish pur-
chaser appeal, but fail to provide the protection 
which the legislature deems the situation war-
rants. 
Numerous states require that all funds collected 
under contracts as described in I. C. 54-1117 be 
deposited and· held in trust. Some include the 
interest accruals. Other states require that the 
greater percentage of the funds be placed in trust. 
We think unquestionably the legislature, by en-
acting this statute, had ,,in mind the protection 
of the public and the prevention of fraud. 
The Idaho case refers also to the case of Reserve Vault 
Corporation v. Jones, 234 Ark. 1011, 356 S.W. 2nd, ·225 
(1962). This case also involves the same problem as 
our case to-wit, the application of these rules to Pre-Need 
Laws, and may it be noted it also went to the Arkansas 
Supreme Court on a writ seeking a declaratory judgment. 
This case answers the problems of the Confiscation and 
Arbitrary Regulation raised by the Defendants and a.s 
they apply to a Pre-Need Law. Both the Idaho and Ar-
kansas eases follow the cases of Me1norial Gardens Asso-
ciation, Inc. v. Smith, 156 N.E. 2nd 578 and Falkner Y. 
Memorial Ga,rdens Association, 298 S.W. 2nd 934 re-
ferred to in appellants' original brief. The Idaho Su-
preme Court winds up its discussion on the question of 
Constitutionality with this conclusion on page 42: 
"Although a fe"\Y statutes somewhat comparable 
but containing distinctive features and different 
regulatory provisions than the ones here being 
considered have been declared void, ,, ... e are satis-
fied tha.t the great weight of authority, with which 
we agree, 1s contrary to appellants' contention 
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and we conclude that the statute here involved 
(I. C. 54-1117) is constitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT V 
THE APPELLANTS' BRIEF DOES - . 
STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONST~ 
TUTE A CAUSE Olf ACTION. 
Defendant Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc., is 
the only Defendant who saw fit to raise this question. 
It is discussed on pp. 10-15 of their Brief. They merely 
quote the law on the issue as to whether or not the prob-
lem before. the Court is "hypothetical or abstract" or 
whether an ''advisory opinion'' is being sought. 
The Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that these Pre-Need 
Contracts of Defendants are being sold or are intended for 
sale (R. 2) that Defendants are soliciting and selling con-
tracts to furnish funeral services ( R. 4) that the Plain-
tiffs would be compelled to participate in activities that 
are of doubtful legality in order to meet the competition 
created by the Defendants' activities, and the Defend-
ants' public officers have indicated uncertainty as to the 
position which should be taken on the legality of these 
activities (R. 5) ; the Complaint further alleges that a de-
cision as to the legality or illegality of these contracts 
being sold is of vital importance to the financial welfare 
of the Plaintiffs as well as the Defendants and other com-
panies. All Defendants admit they are selling their re-
spective Pre-Need Contracts: see on behalf of Memoria] 
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Trusts, Inc., their answer to paragraphs 2, 5 and 8 of 
Plaintiffs' Complaints (R. 13, 15, 16), they also admit 
selling such contracts on pages 3 and 4 of their Brief. 
On behalf of Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc., 
they admit they sell caskets, which is subject to the Pre-
Need Law (R. 26); and in paragraph 7 of their answer 
(R. 27) admit they sell the contract attached to Plain-
tiffs' Complaint (R. 8). It is to be noted this contract 
under ''Items Covered'' in the contract, everything to 
a complete funeral is included. 
On behalf of Defendants Lake Hills, they admit sell-
ing the contract (R. 36 and 40) produced by them on 
court order. (See Rear side of R. 40.) 
Defendants Autorest Memorial Corporation de-
faulted and made no denials of the Plaintiffs' allegations 
that they are selling a contract with a complete funeral 
(R. 12). 
This action is seeking a Declaratory Judgment based 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment which would be 
based upon the pleadings (R. 32-33). See Rule 56 
U.R.C.P. 
Appellant submits there is a real and genuine issue 
involved herein. It is not seeking advice only. Their 
Contracts are being sold as admitted in the pleadings. 
The rights of Parties are at stake and there are real con-
troversial issues involved. The jeopardy of the Plain-
tiffs is genuine and pending and the problem is not merely 
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a moot question. The Plaintiffs can suffer injury if the 
present condition of further sales is allowed to continue 
and if the issues raised herein are left undecided. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff-Appellants request the Honorable 
Court to reverse the decision of the lower court as prayed 
for by the Plaintiff-Appellants in their original Brief 
and to affirm the lower court decision that the Plaintiff-
Appellants had stated a cause of action in their Com-
plaint and that a Justiciable issue exists. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C.N. OTTOSEN 
CALVIN L. RAMP TON 
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